Wednesday, September 11, 2019

"GREATER LEBANON": WHERE TO? By Ghassan Kadi 19 August 2019



“Greater Lebanon”: where to?
19 August 2019
"Syria has to win her moral war like she won her military war; and I have been emphasizing the need to do so in many previous articles, because unlike most other wars, this war has been a war of morality against immorality. Morality and corruption do not mix, and fighting corruption should now be high on President Assad’s agenda.
But above all, Syria is the key for the future of the region. She is the key for the regional geopolitical make-up, the key for Lebanon, the key for justice for Palestinians, the key for Palestine, the key for any matter pertaining to the Levant, because Syria is The Levant."

http://thesaker.is/greater-lebanon-where-to/?fbclid=IwAR0i8g4_EOjb2H7g0VFvz21lAc1X4n6fPQvBP00aYikSAoiTHHYtTSdxT8Q


“Greater Lebanon”: where to?

by Ghassan Kadi for The Saker Blog

Abou Omar, a close friend of mine, is one whom I have so much in common. Not only he was my boss many moons ago, but we were both brought up in political families that endorsed and advocated the unity and integrity of Syria.

When I caught up with him recently after many years, I was not surprised that our thoughts had many congruencies, and the discussion we had has given me the inspiration to write this article.

One does not have to be a member of the Social Syrian National Party (SSNP) to realize that Syria and Lebanon have been the same country up till nearly a century ago when French General Gouraud redrew the map of what was then called “Petit Liban” (ie Small Lebanon) and annexed to it other territories and gave the “Grand Liban” (Greater Lebanon) tag to the new entity.

One of my first articles on The Saker, if not the first, was titled “The Capitulation of Grand Liban” https://thesaker.is/the-capitulation-of-grand-liban/. It outlines briefly the history of Lebanon in the 100 years or so.

For the benefit of those who do not wish to read the whole article above, I reiterate that the term “Small Lebanon” was used to describe a predominantly Christian Maronite and Druze entity. This state was the love child of an uneasy concession of the ailing Ottoman Empire to European powers (Britain, France, Italy, Austria and Russia) to give Mount Lebanon a reprieve after decades of sectarian strife between the Maronites and the Druze. The Maronites, being Catholic, were France’s favourites, whilst the Druze were Britain’s.

In rebranding Lebanon, as it were, and for whichever reason, Gouraud decided to include a Muslim component to the Lebanese demography. To this effect, the predominantly Sunni coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli, Saida plus other Sunni provinces in the North, together with some Shiite provinces in the South and the Beqaa Valley were included in the new Mosaic that gave, according to the 1932 census, a marginal Maronite majority and hence stipulated, perhaps as planned, that the President of Lebanon will have to be a Maronite Christian. http://countrystudies.us/lebanon/34.htm

The 1932 infamous census was used as the defining foundation of “fairness” upon which all positions in all tiers of government were established. So unlike other states that provide merit-based employment, not only the President of Lebanon had to be a Catholic Maronite, but the PM had to be a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the House a Shiite Muslim, his deputy a Christian Orthodox and so forth. Each electorate was represented on sectarian grounds by candidates of same religion and sect, and even unqualified positions had to be based on “sectarian equality”. A government office could not even hire a janitor even if it needed only one, it must hire two; a Christian and a Muslim.

It wasn’t till the 1989 Taif agreement that followed the sectarian Civil War that the 1932-based model was revisited. But after a decade and a half of blood bath, one would think that the failed sectarian model was dumped altogether, but it wasn’t. It was only amended to give Muslims equal number of Parliamentarians as against the former 11-9 split.

But that sectarian “compromise”, which in itself was a reason for conflict, was not the only problem Lebanon had and has. In the 1920’s, the “new” Sunni Lebanese did not want to belong to what they considered a Western puppet state, and they took to the streets chanting “We demand Syrian unity, Christians and Muslims”. A few decades later when Egyptian President Nasser rose to prominence, the children of the first generation of new Lebanese took to the streets with a slightly amended version of the slogan demanding Arab unity for Christians and Muslims.

The Right-wing Lebanese Christians therefore felt Lebanese Muslims are fifth columnists who are not loyal to Lebanon, and as the rift grew and the Lebanese Left supported the PLO in its struggle, the Christian Right formed well trained and equipped militia, and the 1975-1989 Civil War was an inevitable outcome.

When the Syrian Army entered Lebanon in 1976 upon the request of the Lebanese Government, Syria had a golden opportunity to mend the growing rift between Lebanon and Syria, a rift that was fanned by pre-Civil War economic and development successes of Westernized Lebanon as opposed to an impoverished socialist Syria. But by then, Syria was on the road towards recovery under a huge nation-building scheme that was put in place by President Hafez Assad, the father of the current President and the founder of the Assad legacy.

Ironically, even after four and a half decades of the Lebanese slump and Syrian rise (despite the war), some Lebanese still live in the past and feel and act superior to their Syrian cousins. I say cousins not only metaphorically, but also because there is hardly a family in Lebanon that doesn’t have family in Syria.

But during the 29 year long presence of Syrian troops in Lebanon, Syria did not manage to win the hearts and minds of the average apprehensive Lebanese. Among many other acts of corruption, Abou Omar’s (my friend) car was stolen by a corrupt Syrian Army officer. Acts of such nature did not sway those who understood the basics of the anti-Syrian politics. Abou Omar was a victim of corrupt Syrian Army thugs, but his loyalty to Syria remained unwavering.

Ironically, eventually a substantial section of Lebanese Sunnis became aggressively Lebanese in their outlook. It is possible that the current anti Hezbollah passion has united some Sunnis and Christians against a “common enemy”. But perhaps by the time they developed this sentiment, it was already too late for Great Lebanon to rise from the ashes.

And whilst the Lebanese economy is going down the gurgler, corruption is having a huge surge and the state is now virtually bankrupt with very heavy debt and no solution in sight. Corruption has reached epic proportions that recently, a Lebanese Member of Parliament has publically said in the House that the public knows that politicians are lying to the public about the debt, and the politicians know that the public knows that the politicians are lying. https://www.facebook.com/1234196636614228/posts/2624089564291588?s=549881917&v=e&sfns=mo (Facebook link).

During the Civil War, the specter of Lebanese partition was always on the cards and high on some agendas. Back then, the scenario for such a partition was that Israel would take South Lebanon and control the Litani River water, a Maronite “canton” akin to the former Small Lebanon would be created, and the North and the Beqaa would go back to Syria.

Such a partition scenario is no longer feasible, mainly because there is a new force on the ground; Hezbollah.

With Hezbollah on the ground, Israel will never be able to secure any territorial gains in Lebanon. Furthermore, the Maronite politicians ie members of the so-called “The Maronite Political Entity” are now split between a traditional Right and pro-Hezbollah faction. The incumbent President Aoun belongs to the latter group, but his tenure has thus far been plagued by bigtime corruption and squandering of resources.

Aoun’s ascendance to the presidency was not an easy birth. It was fraught with hard labour and many political settlements; the most important of which was the reconciliation of Maronite leaders. Another friend of mine, a former ambassador, a Sunni, told me back then that he felt that the Maronite-Maronite reconciliation puts Lebanon finally in good hands. This is because the Maronites are meant to be the custodians of Lebanon, the integrity of its statehood and independence, and that they would rebuild the state and its economy. But the Aoun presidency has failed abysmally and poured oil onto fire with its rampant corruption. Aoun, who is in his eighties, has given the actual reigns to his son-in-law Gibran Bassil, and Bassil is one hell of a corrupt crook with an insatiable fetish for dirty money.

General Gouraud announced the birth Greater Lebanon 99 years ago, and specifically on on the 1st of September 1920 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Lebanon. Will this state survive another century? It is simply cannot, because it is heading towards a cliff edge, and heading there fast.

So where does Greater Lebanon go from here?

With partition no longer on the agenda and Israel kept at arm’s length, Lebanon can only eventually merge back with Syria; but currently this is not possible given that the “War on Syria” has not yet ended.

Sooner or later, one way or the other, willingly or unwillingly, fully or partially, and I dare say for better or for worse, the Lebanese will see themselves back in the bosom of Syria. This however will be faced by resistance; not necessarily armed resistance, but one cannot zero out violence. Ironically this time, the biggest opponents may prove to be the anti-Syria Sunnis in the major coastal cities of Beirut, Tripoli and Saida. The Right wing Lebanese Christian groups will also oppose any such merger, but the much wiser Lebanese Christians understand that Syria has proven to be the actual defender and custodian of Levantine Christianity when the West stood by and watched young Christian Syrian girls sold as sex slaves.

The success or failure of the future “Take 2” version of the Syrian Army entering Lebanon will also depend on to what extent victorious Syria will be able to curb corruption within Syria first. A repeat of the 1976-2005 experience of Syrian Army presence in Lebanon will ultimately lead to another unsavoury outcome.

Syria has to win her moral war like she won her military war; and I have been emphasizing the need to do so in many previous articles, because unlike most other wars, this war has been a war of morality against immorality. Morality and corruption do not mix, and fighting corruption should now be high on President Assad’s agenda.

But above all, Syria is the key for the future of the region. She is the key for the regional geopolitical make-up, the key for Lebanon, the key for justice for Palestinians, the key for Palestine, the key for any matter pertaining to the Levant, because Syria is The Levant.


Tuesday, July 2, 2019

Idlib & Gulf of Oman How US and Its Allies are Raising Stakes in the Middle East. 25 June 2019 (Interview)

https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201906251076042341-idlib-syria-iran-us/?fbclid=Ihttps://sputniknews.com/analysis/201906251076042341-idlib-syria-iran-us/?fbclid=IwAR1vgtlxloyHW_eGCBsptyi7X45HXnGcTXyJ8l16HYdQS7u1UYbkE56cubY
Interview by Ekaterina Blinova
https://sputniknews.com/20190625/idlib-syria-iran-us-1076042341.html
https://sptnkne.ws/mJDn

Idlib & Gulf of Oman: How US and Its Allies are Raising Stakes in the Middle East

Syrian army artillery soldiers in Idlib province in northwestern Syria. file photo  - Sputnik International
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The US and its allies are involved in a collective act of brinkmanship by simultaneously ramping up tensions over Idlib and the Persian Gulf trying to force Damascus, Tehran, and Moscow into making concessions, say political analysts of Syrian origin.

The UN and US have stepped up criticism of Damascus and Moscow over the worsening humanitarian situation in Idlib and accused them of "indiscriminative" air strikes, something that Russia and Syria resolutely denied.

On 21 June, United Nations Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for the Syria Crisis Panos Moumtzis condemned the "deplorable" violence against civilians in Idlib.

"I am shocked and appalled by reports of an incident yesterday in which a female patient and three paramedic staff were killed when the ambulance they were travelling in to Maarat Al Numan main hospital, in Idlib, was hit by a strike", Moumtzis stated.

Earlier, on 18 June United Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator Mark Lowcock told the UN Security Council that "over the last six weeks, the conduct of hostilities has resulted in more than 230 civilian deaths including 69 women and 81 children", adding that an estimated 330,000 people had fled their homes since 1 May.

Referring to reported attacks on Idlib medical facilities and schools, Lowcock pointed the finger at the Syrian government and Russia, claiming that "some have drawn the conclusion that hospital bombings are a deliberate tactic aimed at terrorising people”.

Moscow and Damascus have rejected the allegations, stressing that they were fighting against the UN-designated terrorist group Hayat Tahrir Al Sham*.

"We decisively reject any accusation of indiscriminate strikes. We're not carrying out attacks on civilians”, stated Russia's UN Ambassador Vassily Nebenzia.

For his part, Syrian UN Ambassador Bashar Ja'afari emphasised that "Syrians and allies do not target schools or hospitals".

US President Donald Trump previously claimed that Russia, Syria, and Iran were "bombing the hell out of Idlib Province in Syria”.

​According to Christopher Assad, a Canada-based political analyst of Syrian origin, the US and its allies in the UN are deliberately increasing pressure on Russia, Iran and the Syrian government to force them "to re-consider their resolve to eradicate the terrorist organisation(s) in Idlib".

"These pressure tactics run contrary to UNSC resolutions", Assad underscored, stressing that some of Idlib's civilian targets are now infested with Islamic terrorists who are routinely using ordinary people as human shields.

"I anticipate the military campaign against terrorists in Idlib to bear fruit sooner rather than later", he stressed.

For his part, Ghassan Kadi, a political commentator and analyst of Syrian descent, noted that Lowcock's rhetoric "seems to echo the words of the NATO camp, again without any substantiated evidence, and this is not a surprise".

Idlib-based Terrorists Expanding Military Activities in Syria

While raising accusations against Russia and the Syrian government, the US and its allies have seemingly overlooked the increase in activity of Idlib-based extremists over the past few months, outlined by Syria’s ambassador to the United Nations Dr Bashar Jaafari during his 18 June speech at the UN Security Council.

Dr Jaafari drew attention to the growing number of artillery attacks by Idlib-based terrorists on neighbouring towns and villages of Aleppo, Northern Hama, and the northern Latakia countryside in May 2019. He also highlighted ongoing attacks on "the positions of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) and the locations of the allied Russian forces, especially the Hmeymim Airport, with rockets and booby-trapped drones".

Idlib Province is home to various jihadi groups with around 30,000 militants operating in the area, including the Turkey-backed National Front for Liberation (Jabhat al-Wataniya lil-Tahrir) and Hayat Tahrir Al Sham*, an umbrella terrorist organisation led by the al-Nusra Front*.

"Russia is adamant to bring to an end to the war in Syria, but it has to juggle its way into a final resolution very strategically", Ghassan Kadi opined.

"After all, Russia’s regional interests are not restricted to Syria, but they include Turkey and Israel. Out of the two, Turkey is the closer big neighbour that holds the key to free navigation in the Sea of Marmara. Among other things President Putin does not want a return to the feuding days between Imperial Russia and Ottoman Turkey. Russia must have good relationships with Turkey, and Arab supporters of Russia ought to understand and accept this", he said.

Idlib & Gulf of Oman: How US and Its Allies are Raising Stakes in the Middle East - Sputnik International
Syrian northwestern city of Idlib.

While Turkey is maintaining control in the Idlib region, it will have to eventually withdraw from the area and pass the baton to Damascus, the analyst highlighted.

In the summer of 2018, Moscow, Damascus, and Tehran discussed the necessity of an Idlib operation to nix the last terrorist stronghold in Syria. However, Ankara vociferously resisted the potential advance, citing the possibility of a new refugee crisis.

As a result, the Idlib ceasefire regime was brokered by Russia and Turkey on 17 September 2018 within the framework of the trilateral Astana format and was re-affirmed in mid-May 2019 amid an escalation of hostilities in the region.

Still, as Nebenzia pointed out addressing the UN Security Council on 18 June, "like other territories of the Syrian Arab Republic [Idlib] should return to the control of the Syrian government and the terrorists have to be liquidated".

Who Blinks First? Idlib and Persian Gulf in Focus of World's Attention

Meanwhile, on 22 May, the US government claimed that "it had seen signs the Syrian government may again be using chemical weapons" in Idlib to facilitate the recapture of the last jihadi-held stronghold. Washington warned that it would respond "quickly and appropriately" if the claims are proven. As of yet no evidence backing the claims has surfaced.

Earlier on 21 May, the head of the Russian centre for Syrian reconciliation, Maj. Gen. Viktor Kupchishin warned in a daily briefing that terrorists were planning chemical attacks in the Idlib de-escalation zone.

Kadi agreed that the situation bore a strong resemblance to the Khan Shaykhun and Douma chemical incidents, which took place on 4 April 2017 and 7 April 2018, respectively. The episodes were hastily blamed on Damascus by the Trump administration which led to massive strikes by the US and its allies on Syrian government targets.

"What we are seeing now is a collective act of brinkmanship; not only in Syria, but also in the Persian Gulf. It is a game of 'who blinks first'”, the political analyst opined, referring to the Gulf of Oman incidents occurring in May and June 2019 and groundlessly attributed to Iran by Washington.

Idlib & Gulf of Oman: How US and Its Allies are Raising Stakes in the Middle East - Sputnik International
An Iranian navy boat tries to stop the fire of an oil tanker after it was attacked in the Gulf of Oman, June 13, 2019

The US-Iran enmity is swiftly escalating. The Gulf of Oman incidents were followed by the downing of a US RQ-4 Global Hawk surveillance drone which, according to the Iranian leadership, was engaged in a spying operation near Kuhmobarak in the southern province of Hormozgan.

​Tehran's move was dubbed by Trump "a very big mistake" while some American media outlets started speculating that the US president was about to authorise a strike on Iran but "abruptly pulled back". However, in his next move Trump announced that he would impose new heavy sanctions on Iran specifically targeting the country's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. In response, Tehran made it clear that US sanctions on Khamenei means "the permanent closure of the path of diplomacy".

As tensions in the Middle East increase, it all depends on what side regional players, most notably Turkey, will take, Kadi believes.

"Recep Tayyip Erdogan must decide on which foot he wants to stand. After all, he is the NATO member who seems to be on better terms with Russia than he is with the US", the political analyst said.

*Hayat Tahrir Al Sham and al-Nusra Front are terrorist organisations banned in Russia.

The views and opinions expressed by the contributor and speakers do not necessarily reflect those of Sputnik.

 

Wednesday, May 22, 2019

DISSECTING THE UNFATHOMABLE AMERICAN-IRANIAN WAR. By Ghassan Kadi 21 May 2019

DISSECTING THE UNFATHOMABLE AMERICAN-IRANIAN WAR.
https://thesaker.is/dissecting-the-unfathomable-american-iranian-war/

Dissecting The Unfathomable American-Iranian War:

by Ghassan Kadi for The Saker Blog

As the American military build-up continues around the Strait of Hormuz, and as a potential American-Iranian war looms, many analysts are convinced that war is imminent. I beg to differ.

Ever since the “War on Syria” started, I kept reiterating that America would never launch a full-on attack on Syria, and for very good reasons, and not long ago, I finally felt compelled to write a series of articles explaining that in as much as America would love to be able to pillage Syria, it is unable to do so.

Here is the link for one of the articles for those who might be interested.

https://thesaker.is/war-on-syria-not-quite-according-to-plan-part-3-a-usa-unable-to-bomb-syria/

Those predictions, which stood the test of time, were made long before the Russian involvement in Syria, and now, after Syria’s triumph, the chances of a decisive victory that America is able to score by way of a military gamble anywhere in the Middle East have been shrinking and reduced to the level of zero chance. If anything, the “War on Syria” was the surrogate war that America could not launch directly either on Syria or on Iran, and even by turning its war into a war by proxy, America was still unable to win.

To recap briefly, some obstacles that stood against an all-out American NATO-led assault on Syria back in 2013, I argued that America would never risk a retaliatory attack against Israel by both Syria and Hezbollah.

An American attack on Iran will not eliminate the risk of a Hezbollah retaliatory attack on Israel, and if anything, it will bring in a new risk; the risk of a retaliatory Iranian attack on Saudi soil.

Whether or not an American-Iranian show down will directly involve Saudi troops, given that Saudi Arabia is still unable to win in its war against Yemen, even though it has the third largest military budget after the USA and China, a direct Saudi role will have little in effecting any significant input. However, with or without a direct Saudi intervention, an American attack on Iran will immediately put American interests in Saudi Arabia under the Iranian target list.

In the event of such an attack, the first thing that Iran will do is close marine traffic in the Strait of Hormuz. As a result, the whole world will be affected and the price of a barrel of oil may jump to $200 and beyond, but the relevant issue here is the impact on the feasibility of American military success.

An American attack on Iran cannot be seen as an event that is independent from the wars on Syria and Yemen. It will be seen as an upscaling that directly involves Iran. Any such turning point will sooner or later involve Saudi Arabia directly. And given that Iran will more than likely close the Strait of Hormuz and thereby putting all Saudi oil exports to halt, whether or not Iran intended to intimidate America alone, the Saudis will see it as an act of war; and they will be “forced” to retaliate.

But the moment the Iranians see that Saudi forces are involved in military action against them, they will have a huge array of critical soft Saudi targets to hit; all the way from oil wells, ports, and more importantly perhaps, water desalination plants that are all scattered on the east coast of Saudi Arabia; ie across the gulf from Iran.

Those sites are undoubtedly protected by ground to air defence shields, but in the face of thousands, tens of thousands of cheap rockets fired from Iran, much more expensive and harder-to-come-by Patriot missiles will not be able to totally stop waves and waves of Iranian rockets.

The Saudi desalination plants feed all cities in the east; including the capital Riyadh. Without them, Saudi citizens will have no water. And without oil exports, they will also lose their income.

Power stations are also in the east, if they get hit, eastern Saudi Arabia will plunge into darkness, and as summer approaches, without air-conditioning, today’s Saudis who are not any longer attuned to the harsh climate of the desert, will suffer greatly from heat exhaustion; especially without water and fuel.

America may not give a damn about Saudis, but it cannot afford to lose Saudi revenue.

But this is only on the eastern front.

On the southern front, a weaker Saudi Arabia will have to relent in its attack on Yemen. Where will this leave the battle front?

On the western front however, an all-out American attack on Iran will be seen as a bigger existential threat to Hezbollah than the “War on Syria”. Hezbollah will retaliate by hitting back at Israel; not only using its rocket power in a retaliatory manner, but also for leverage and the ability to trade-off a cease fire against Israel by an American one against Iran. A scenario like this can become a game of playing chicken and seeing who blinks first; and more than likely, faced by potential civilian casualties, Israel will be the party to relent.

An onslaught of Hezbollah rockets on Israel has been something that the USA has thus far managed to avoid; despite its deep role in the “War on Syria”. But if the carnage eventuates, America will be “forced” to supply Israel with a massive number of Patriot missiles. But these cost more than a million dollars each at least. Such figures are easy to estimate even according to sources such as Wikipedia. But the question is, who is going to fork out the cost? Furthermore, Hezbollah is estimated to have over 150 thousand rockets poised at Israel. Does America have enough Patriots to intercept them? And if THAAD missiles are to be used here and there, the economy becomes more daunting with batteries costing over a billion dollars each, according to Wikipedia again.

This of course brings in the bigger question of economy; ie the economic front. If the invasion of Iraq has cost the American treasury something between 2 and 4 trillion dollars, how much will a war with Iran cost? With the American economy on the brink, can America financially afford a new war with an enemy that it hasn’t tested the fighting prowess of?

Trump was quoted saying that a war with Iran will be the official end of Iran. https://sputniknews.com/us/201905201075143491-trump-iran-threat-fight/. But the United States of America has thus far lost all of its post WWII wars, even though they were all launched against foes of seemingly much less military readiness than Iran. As a matter of fact, if one looks at the regional strategic risks, the military risks, plus the economic risks, an American war against Iran could well become the straw that breaks America’s back.

The above analysis does not even take into account the economic impact of such war on the EU and/or the possibility of Russian, Chinese and Indian roles.

As an energy exporter, Russia may gain from inflated petrol and gas prices, but strategically, it is not going to sit idle as America wreaks havoc and imposes superiority in an area that is of high interest to Russia. But China and India, and the EU, are highly dependent on fuel that has no way out of its origin to their ports other than via the Strait of Hormuz. Some EU nations may give America some grace if convinced by big brother that the attack will only last a matter of days, but what if it takes weeks, months, or years? What if the norm becomes a $200 oil barrel? Which world economy can survive such a calamity?

The only logical scenario here is that not unless America is able to incinerate Iran in a single knockout blow, any attack on Iran will result in a series of independent repercussions that have the potential of turning the attack into a nightmare for America.

The days of bottomless pockets that allowed America to launch wars on Korea and Vietnam under the guise of fighting Communism are no more.

The days of the so-called “New World Order” of the post-USSR period and which gave America a carte-blanche to attack Iraq, Afghanistan, Iraq again and Libya was put on hold in Syria, and Russia has marked her redlines for any such future offensives.

Without international impunity, without a successful military track record, without the risk of retaliation against Israel, with the prospect of losing EU support, with the prospect of turning the Saudi war on Yemen in favour of the Houthis, destroying the Saudi economy and leaving Saudis without power and water, and above all, without enough funds to fight a war that can last a very, very long time, and finally, without being able to hit Iran with a single knockout blow that can avoid all of the above, how can America enter this venture?

Hawks like Bolton may think that any military action is a walk in the park, but the top brass in the American military know better. Love him or hate him, Trump is a pragmatic man, financially pragmatic perhaps, but this is alone enough reason for him not to take stupid financial decisions; and any war against Iran will be judged by Trump on its financial merits.

On paper, Trump will see that this war is impossible to win, and just like his White House predecessors who have eyed Syria in the hope of being able to attack it, he will be the chicken who will blink first and find a face-saving exit. At the end of the day, if on the scale of one to ten, America’s decision to not attack Syria scored eight, the decision not to attack Iran will score ten.



Monday, April 1, 2019

Bombing of Aleppo: Analyst on How Israel Raises Stakes After Trump's Golan Move. (Sputnik Interview with Ghassan Kadi)

 

Bombing of Aleppo: Analyst on How Israel Raises Stakes After Trump's Golan Mov

30 March 2019

https://sputniknews.com/analysis/201903301073667660-syria-israel-russia/?fbclid=IwAR2-cDagYEJL16CyBww91EG7lPqzgHh1LJPsDOueCenyhrBNIj4sI-xIHWk

Bombing of Aleppo: Analyst on How Israel Raises Stakes After Trump's Golan Move

Two Israeli air force F-15s (File) - Sputnik International
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Shortly after the US recognised Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, Aleppo was subjected to air strikes attributed to the Israeli Air Force (IAF) by the Syrian military. Speaking to Sputnik, Ghassan Kadi, a political analyst of Syrian origin, shared his views on what was behind the reported Israeli attack.

A few days after Donald Trump signed a presidential proclamation recognising the Golan Heights as Israel's territory, the Syrian state-owned media reported that Israel had launched air strikes against the Syrian city of Aleppo. Tel Aviv neither confirmed nor denied the claim.

Commenting on the alleged attack, Ghassan Kadi, a political analyst of Syrian origin, suggested that "Israel's main objective in the Aleppo airstrike is to demonstrate to the regional players, including Russia, that Israel is still capable of launching such attacks".

At the same time, "they are also for public consumption in a bid for Netanyahu to win votes in the upcoming elections", he said, referring to the early parliamentary vote that will be held in Israel on 9 April 2019 to elect members of the Knesset, the country's unicameral parliament.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers a statement to the media - Sputnik International
Netanyahu Vows to Further Counter Iran in Syria Day After Reported Aleppo Raid
"In reality, and unless they turn into massive and continuous air-raids, which is something that Israel will find extremely difficult to achieve, with or without risking retaliations that can reach deep into Israel, sporadic strikes will not create much impact on the ground either against Syria itself, or in favour of the so called 'Tel Aviv struggle against Iran'", the political analyst opined.

On 28 March, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reiterated his vow to prevent any alleged deployment of Iranian ballistic missiles in Syria.

"Iran is constantly trying to place in Syria precision long-range missile [sic] that are very advanced and highly lethal missiles. We are not prepared to accept this. Our activity against Iran's attempt to establish military bases in Syria and to place advanced weapons there, continues all the time", he said.

Why Trump's Golan Move Failed to Spark Protests on the Ground

When asked why Donald Trump's recognition of the Golan Heights as Israel's territory had failed to stir fierce protests akin to those triggered by the transfer of the US Embassy to Jerusalem, Kadi agreed that "the condemnation remained mainly official".

"Jerusalem is different", he explained. "Jerusalem is not only seen as the capital of Palestine, but also as a Muslim holy shrine. Its American recognition as the capital of Israel stirred up religious emotions throughout the Muslim World".

As for Trump's Golan move, the analyst believes that it is much of a symbolic nature and does not change anything on the ground.

"America's recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan is no more than tokenistic and does not change anything", he said. "The issue at hand is the Israeli occupation, and not how superpowers of vested interest regard it".

A mock road sign for Damascus, the capital of Syria, and a cutout of a soldier, are displayed in an old outpost in the Israeli controlled Golan Heights near the border with Syria, Thursday, May 10, 2018 - Sputnik International
Gift to Bibi or Blow to Syria? Possible Motives Behind US Golan Heights Decision
According to the analyst, the same applies to Washington's recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital: "It did not change anything other than stirring emotions".

"It is neither America nor Israel that has the authority to legitimise any question that involves justice and morality. Throughout history, bigger and stronger nations have allowed themselves to pillage smaller ones under the law of big-fish-eat-small-fish. This does not make it legitimate though", he emphasised.

Following Trump's recognition of Israel's sovereignty over the Golan Heights, the UN made it clear that the move would not affect the legal status of the Syrian territory, which has been occupied by Israel since 1967. Russia, Turkey, as well as a number of Arab and European states, condemned Trump's move.

The move followed Washington's transfer of the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem on 14 May 2018, which was accompanied by massive protests launched by the Palestinians in several cities across the disputed territories. For its part, Hamas, an Islamist movement, announced the beginning of the third intifada ("rebellion").

Russia Continues to Play the First Fiddle

Washington's political gestures towards Israel raises question as to whether Trump will pass the "military baton" to Netanyahu after the US withdrawal from the region.

"When we talk about the US withdrawal from Syria, we have to seriously ask ourselves, which withdrawal?" the analyst remarked, referring to Trump's regular flip-flops on the issue.

In this file photo taken on December 30, 2018, shows a line of US military vehicles in Syria's northern city of Manbij - Sputnik International
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According to Kadi, Special Counsel Robert Mueller's conclusions, which indicated no collusion with Russia, have untied Trump's hands: "After the Mueller report, Trump may become more at liberty to do what Trump wants, including withdrawal from Syria if this is what he really wants", the analyst noted.

"But if and when this happens, inadvertently, he would not be passing the baton to Netanyahu, but to [Russian President Vladimir] Putin", he said in a reference to Russia's increasing role in Syria and Middle Eastern affairs in general.

In late December 2018, Donald Trump announced the withdrawal of the 2,000-strong military contingent from Syria. However, in response to mounting pressure from US lawmakers and Washington's allies, the US president announced in February 2019 that the Pentagon would leave at least 400 US troops in the region after the pull-out of most US forces from Syria this spring.

Meanwhile, Russia has maintained a military presence on the ground in Syria since 2015. Moscow's intervention at the request of the legitimate Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad has become a game changer in the Syrian Civil War and contributed much to the elimination of Daesh (ISIS/ISIL)* in the region.

*Daesh (ISIS/ISIL) is a terrorist organisation banned in Russia.

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