LEBANON’S DILEMMA; A Revolving Identity Crisis. Part IV. The Emergence of the Role of Lebanese Shia By Ghassan Kadi. 25 February 2020

LEBANON’S DILEMMA; A Revolving Identity Crisis. Part IV. The Emergence of the Role of Lebanese Shia

By Ghassan Kadi 25 February 2020.

The 1943 Lebanese constitution was reached by consensus mainly between the political Maronite and Sunni leaders; all in accordance with the initial plans of Patriarch Howayyek. The constitution stipulated that the main positions of power were given to the Maronites, these are namely the position of the President and Army Chief. The Sunnis got the position of the Prime Minister, the Druze had the army’s Chief of Staff and the Shia got the token position of the Leader of the House. Furthermore, Christians were given bigger representation in the Lebanese Parliament at the ratio of 11 Christian members versus 9 Muslim members. Those figures were subdivided to include sects, with the Maronites receiving the lion’s share.

The political Maronite establishment was eventually represented by a number of political parties; the most prominent of which is the Kata’eb Party (aka the Phalangists). This party trained and armed militia groups and played a major part in the Lebanese Civil War that devastated Lebanon in the 1970’s and 80’s.

The Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) which has been mentioned in previous articles, remains thus far the only political party in the Levant that calls for the unity of Greater Syria. Soon after its establishment in 1932, it gained much popularity both within Lebanon and Syria. But this popularity started to dwindle after the highly charismatic Egyptian President Nasser rose to prominence advocating pan-Arab nationalism.

In 1952, Camille Chamoun was elected as president of Lebanon. He was a staunch supporter of an independent Lebanese identity. He became very unpopular amongst Muslim Nasserites and the Left. And after the declaration of union between Egypt and Syria in 1958 under the name of the United Arab Republic, Lebanese Nasser sympathisers saw an opportunity for Lebanon to join the union. In lieu of following the footsteps of their fathers by taking to the streets asking for Syrian unity, they demanded Arab unity instead. In another twist of fate, looking at what is happening in the streets of Lebanon now, the grandchildren of the Lebanese Arab nationalists are now at the forefront, brandishing Lebanese flags, advocating Lebanese identity and demanding Lebanese sovereignty.

Back to the Chamoun era; civil unrest followed in 1958 and, finally President Chamoun asked the West to act on its promise to protect the integrity of Lebanon. The US Sixth Fleet was sent, Chamoun finished his term, and Army Chief Chehab was elected as president.

The tenure of Chamoun’s presidency however, marked the beginning of what is commonly termed as Lebanon’s “golden age”, the center of beauty and vice which was discussed in a previous chapter. The Chehab period provided Lebanon with much needed stability to build on Chamoun’s era and Lebanon’s economy prospered.

When war broke out between Syria, Egypt and Jordan against Israel in June 1967, which later on became known as the Six-Day War, Lebanon was basically a spectator. All participating Arab states lost territory to Israel but Lebanon did not because it did not partake in the conflict. In the eyes of many Arabs, Lebanon was a Western implant, a pariah state, second worst only to Israel.

This was all to change, and so unpredictably. Lebanon was suddenly unable to remain isolated from its surroundings and the Arab/Israeli conflict reached its door step.

It all began when the PLO started to have a presence in Lebanon in the late 1960’s. As a result, in the closing days of 1968, Israel launched a brazen attack on Beirut airport and destroyed 13 airliner jets that belonged to the national carrier, Middle East Airlines, setting them alight. The international response was that of outrage. Lebanon was not meant to be part of the conflict and, French President De Gaulle, put a ban on French arms sales to Israel. This was the first military Israeli attack on Lebanon, but it was not going to be the last.

Only a year later, and after being pushed out of Jordan, the PLO moved into south Lebanon. This resulted in a number of skirmishes with the Lebanese Army but, later on in November 1969, Egyptian President Nasser brokered a deal between the PLO and the Lebanese Government which allowed the PLO to move its major base for its operations against Israel to Lebanon. Rachid Karami, the then Lebanese Prime Minister, refused to be the Lebanese official to sign the document. He did not want his endorsement to be seen as that of a Sunni leader compromising the sovereignty of Lebanon. Instead, the Army Chief, Emille Boustany, (a Maronite) was asked to go to Egypt to ratify the agreement.

The agreement became known as the “Cairo Agreement” and it was successful in easing the tension between the Lebanese Army and the PLO, but it opened a Pandora’s Box to other tension and conflict.

Proponents of Lebanese identity, i.e., the Maronite political establishment, accused the PLO for creating a state within a state and blamed it for dragging Lebanon into confrontation with Israel; a matter that did not concern it. The Lebanese Left disagreed and argued that Lebanon could not bury its head in the sand and pretend that the Arab/Israeli conflict did not include Lebanon and, that with or without the presence of the PLO, Lebanon would eventually be dragged into taking its rightful place in history.

By the mid 1970’s, the division in Lebanon over the issue was so intense that it was ripe for a civil war, and that was exactly what happened.

Four and a half decades later, Lebanon is still reeling from the outcome of that Civil War and all the identity issues that have been tugging it in different directions; one advocating for it to be in the bosom of the West, and the other to be at the forefront of resistance. In 1975 however, no one ever imagined that there would be a Lebanese force as mighty and organized as Hezbollah; a force that changed all formulations and predictions and redefined Lebanon.

This takes us back to the Lebanese Shia. Up until the mid to late 1960’s, the literacy rate among Lebanese Shia was low, and they mostly lived in neglected villages in the Bekaa Valley or South. The living situation there was very dire, and many Shia moved to live in poorer outskirts of Beirut. Their situation there was not much better, but at least there were work and education opportunities.

Back when the Lebanese constitution was agreed to and written, the Shia were the underprivileged sector of the Lebanese community, the neglected ones, or the “Mahroumin” (the deprived ones) as the leader, Imam Moussa Assader, eventually named his movement. In a move that is akin to other Lebanese sects, Assader urged the Shia to take arms. He was renowned for saying “arms are the ornaments of men”.

The Mahroumin movement eventually morphed into Amal (meaning hope), and eventually, Hezbollah rose to existence as a splinter group after the Israeli invasion of 1982, all of which shortly followed the disappearance of Imam Moussa Assader in Libya in 1979.

Without going much into details, what is pertinent here is that when the Lebanese Civil War broke out in 1975, it was between the Right wing predominantly Christian militia on one hand, and the PLO and Lebanese Left on the other hand. And even though the Left had many members and leaders who were Shia, the Shia as a group were not a party to the conflict.

By the mid to late 1970’s, friction started to develop between different PLO factions and the people of South Lebanon who are mainly Shia. I will deliberately avoid the argument of taking sides here not only because there are many sides to it, but also because the issue at hand is the actual conflict and not its causes. Either way, by the time the Israeli invasion of Lebanon took place in June 1982, many Lebanese houses flew white flags and greeted the Israelis almost like liberators. Some readers, especially those who have never been to Lebanon will disagree, but I have experienced and seen this with my own eyes. In no time at all however, the Israeli occupation revealed its true nature and the initial attitude towards it by those Lebanese dissolved within weeks and the resistance started to take form.

In the late 1980’s, the Civil War was coming to an end, and as Lebanon was already decimated, the Maronites, Sunnis and Druze were all growing battle weary after fighting each other, the Shia began to take a more leading role. Justified by the Israeli occupation of South Lebanon, Hezbollah rose to prominence as a liberating force.

In hindsight therefore, as the Maronites, Sunnis and Druze were fighting over the division of power and how to split the spoils, they inadvertently not only weakened themselves, but also ended up empowering the forgotten group; the Shia.

Hezbollah proved to be a formidable force capable not only of engaging in guerrilla warfare with Israel, but also actual battle. For that reason, it gained unprecedented support and respect, not only within Lebanon, but also within the entire Arab World and beyond.

When the war on Syria took form, Hezbollah proved to have the power of a regional player, and not only that of a domestic one. Its involvement in Syria was instrumental in turning the tide in favour of the Syrian Government. All the while, as Syria and Hezbollah were scoring military victories within Syria, the Saudi/American influence in Lebanon was fading. The so-called 14^th of March coalition was already fragmenting and losing momentum.

The once Western vassal has made a 180 degree turn and Lebanon catapulted itself right out of the Western sphere of influence. Not only it was no longer the Switzerland of the East, but it became the heart and centre of the anti-Israel Axis of Resistance.

As the Civil War in Lebanon was winding down in 1989, the warring parties met in Taif, Saudi Arabia, to reach an agreement. The agreement (known as the Taif Agreement) did not declare clear winners and losers, but stipulated that Muslims have equal number of members of Parliament to replace the former 11-9 ratio of the 1943 constitution. Later, the Lebanese Forces were disarmed, and their leader Samir Geagea was imprisoned.

Clearly, the traditional political Maronite establishment was seen as the undeclared loser of the war.

Almost in parallel to the rise of Hezbollah to prominence, former Lebanese Army Chief Michel Aoun attempted to gain popularity amongst Lebanese Christians by blaming his political rivals, i.e. the Phalangists and their off-shoot, “The Lebanese Forces”, for the dilution of the Christian power in Lebanon and the loss of the Civil War to the Left. According to his argument, the traditional Maronite political establishment has failed its obligation in protecting the position of the Lebanese Maronites, as stipulated by Patriarch Howayyek. He offered himself and his movement to replace the failed traditional Maronite political powers and to be the proper protector of the Maronites. This move split the Maronites and allowed him to challenge the traditional leaders and their political parties.

As a former enemy of Syria living in exile in France for 15 years, Aoun approached Hezbollah as a potential political ally and, Hezbollah in return, negotiated peace for him with the Syrian Government. All of this happened whilst Hezbollah was also entering the Lebanese political game and having elected members of parliament and eventually ministers.

The Lebanese political system is not a two-party system. The closest resemblance it has to a two-party system is that it is based on two coalitions of many minor parties. But those minor parties change sides quite often. It was therefore essential for both Aoun and Hezbollah to forge a strong alliance because, each of them alone, has control of no more than 15% of the seats. They however, managed to rally up a majority, and eventually Aoun was elected as President in 2016.

Forward to the present moment, traditional Sunni, Maronite and Druze leaders are now all united in their anti-Hezbollah stance. In more ways than one, they seem as if they wish they could wind back the clock to the pre-Civil War days when their power-sharing excluded the Shia. The current street uprising however is presenting a new phase; as we shall see in the next chapter of this series.