Sunday, October 5, 2014

THE IMPLODING HOUSE OF SAUD. Part V. By Ghassan Kadi 4 Oct 2014

By Ghassan Kadi
4 October 2014

In a series of short articles, the rise and current dilemma of the Al-Saud legacy will be very briefly exposed from an angle that focuses on the trilateral relationship between the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Islamic fundamentalists. These articles are meant to shed some light on this subject in an attempt to make it easier for non-Arabs in particular to relate to the history of this triangle, how it was formed, shaped and how it reshaped itself over the last few decades and how it ended up where it is right now.

It is hoped that some myths will be dispelled and that readers will be better able to understand the complexity and unpredictability of today’s events.
The Second Divorce:
The successive Syrian Army wins that followed the Qusayr win in the western regions of Syria, the lack of Bandar’s ability to pull a new trick out of a hat to save and reward his Jihadists plus the unwillingness of America to pitch in militarily, all of these factors combined, left the Jihadists high and dry. They had to make their win happen for themselves independently from their suppliers and financiers.

This was the reason for the second divorce, and many analysts are missing this very crucial point and have thus become unable to understand the underlying factors behind the recent developments and the US-led raids on ISIL bases in Syria and Iraq.

For ISIS to go solo, as it were, it needed its own finance.

Israel runs on the principle of looking at obstacles in terms of force. If a certain amount of force is unable to resolve the obstacle, then more force will. In a similar manner, Saudi Arabia looks at obstacles in terms of money. Saudis believe that they can buy anything and anyone; including President Putin. They created ISIS with money, and they could suffocate it if they cut off the funds, should they need to.

No one can be certain whether or not the Saudis reduced or stopped financing ISIS, but seemingly, the latter was one step ahead. Their recent capture of key Iraqi positions, oil wells, as well as a huge stash of military hardware was a windfall that came from heaven.

Just like Bin Laden got so frustrated when the Saudis did not kick the “Crusader Infidels” from Arabia following Operation Desert Storm and went solo using his own funds and declaring divorce with the Saudis and Americans, so did ISIS following its cash stash and hardware grab in Iraq. This was the pertinent change that enabled ISIS to start acting independently, and this was when the serious rift between the main players within the Anti-Syrian Cocktail began to escalate openly.

The issue of who is Baghdadi (the declared ISIS leader) really is, and whether or not he is even real, a Hollywood fabrication, a puppet, a Mossad agent, or any of the other descriptions and theories that have floated around recently is quite irrelevant. Often, some analysts forget to keep reminding themselves that the actual Jihadi fighters are heavily indoctrinated people who are prepared to blow themselves up in the pursuit of their “divine objective”. Those fighters needed a win, and their leadership, regardless of who heads it, had to provide that win.

America was beginning to smell a rat, serious trouble long before the ISIS takeover of Mosul. The Americans initially truly believed that Bandar was able to switch the Jihadists on and off at will. American foreign policy makers are foolish, very foolish, but to actually believe that they easily accepted to deal with and support Jihadists after the Al-Qaeda experience is equally foolish. However, they received firm and iron-clad assurances from Bandar who was highly trusted and respected by his American friends. Bandar was seen by the Americans as perhaps the only Saudi royal who was rational and able to have rational discussions with them. The American understanding of the deal that included the Jihadist was pragmatic and based on the understanding that it would be very easy to rally up Sunni fundamentalist fighters in the name of Jihad against Assad. America was adamant not to put boots on the ground, and Bandar assured the American administration that there was no need at all for America to do so when he can amass hundreds of fighters, thousands, tens of thousands, hundreds of thousands if needed to do the job. All they needed was funds, to which Saudi Arabia and Qatar happily obliged, Western support and a Western media charade to create false flags when needed. America could not resist the temptation.

To add to America’s concerns was its embarrassment about stories of beheading and desecrating ancient Churches in Syria before the takeover of Mosul. The viciousness of the Jihadists in Syria was no longer something that Western media could ignore. America found itself in a position in which it suddenly had to draw some lines; albeit unclear and non-realistic when the American Administration started referring to “moderate” Syrian “rebels” as against the fundamentalists. In doing so, America was not only trying to save face and to distant itself from being seen as supporting Al-Qaeda-type organizations, but it was grooming the media for a change in its tact and approach towards dealing with the Jihadists.

With the American-Jihadist history and previous experiences, a second divorce was pretty hard enough to work out the details of. Muscle and brawn were put on standby. The much more difficult divorce was the one that was about to happen between ISIS and Al-Saud.

The Saudi royals have painted themselves in a corner and they had to jump either in support of ISIS, or turn around and fight it. Either way, they would be signing off a suicide pact.
In the next chapter, we shall look at the Saudi dilemma.

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